Sunday, September 8, 2013

Secret Syrian Intel Strangles Debate in Congress


Grayson in the NY Times on Syria Intel: “Trust, But Verify”
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This op-ed written by Congressman Alan Grayson appeared in The New York Times today. Read it, share it with your friends and family, and join more than 75,000 others who oppose U.S. military intervention in Syria by signing on at DontAttackSyria.com.

WASHINGTON - THE documentary record regarding an attack on Syria consists of just two papers: a four-page unclassified summary and a 12-page classified summary. The first enumerates only the evidence in favor of an attack. I'm not allowed to tell you what's in the classified summary, but you can draw your own conclusion.

On Thursday I asked the House Intelligence Committee staff whether there was any other documentation available, classified or unclassified. Their answer was "no."

The Syria chemical weapons summaries are based on several hundred underlying elements of intelligence information. The unclassified summary cites intercepted telephone calls, "social media" postings and the like, but not one of these is actually quoted or attached - not even clips from YouTube. (As to whether the classified summary is the same, I couldn't possibly comment, but again, draw your own conclusion.)

Over the last week the administration has run a full-court press on Capitol Hill, lobbying members from both parties in both houses to vote in support of its plan to attack Syria. And yet we members are supposed to accept, without question, that the proponents of a strike on Syria have accurately depicted the underlying evidence, even though the proponents refuse to show any of it to us or to the American public.

In fact, even gaining access to just the classified summary involves a series of unreasonably high hurdles.

We have to descend into the bowels of the Capitol Visitors Center, to a room four levels underground. Per the instructions of the chairman of the House Intelligence Committee, note-taking is not allowed.

Once we leave, we are not permitted to discuss the classified summary with the public, the media, our constituents or even other members. Nor are we allowed to do anything to verify the validity of the information that has been provided.

And this is just the classified summary. It is my understanding that the House Intelligence Committee made a formal request for the underlying intelligence reports several days ago. I haven't heard an answer yet. And frankly, I don't expect one.

Compare this lack of transparency with the administration's treatment of the Benghazi attack. Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton, to her credit, made every single relevant classified e-mail, cable and intelligence report available to every member of Congress. (I know this, because I read them all.)Secretary Clinton had nothing to hide.

Her successor, John Kerry, has said repeatedly that this administration isn't trying to manipulate the intelligence reports the way that the Bush administration did to rationalize its invasion of Iraq.

But by refusing to disclose the underlying data even to members of Congress, the administration is making it impossible for anyone to judge, independently, whether that statement is correct. Perhaps the edict of an earlier administration applies: "Trust, but verify."

The danger of the administration's approach was illustrated by a widely read report last week in The Daily Caller, which claimed that the Obama administration had selectively used intelligence to justify military strikes in Syria, with one report "doctored so that it leads a reader to just the opposite conclusion reached by the original report."

The allegedly doctored report attributes the attack to the Syrian general staff. But according to The Daily Caller, "it was clear that 'the Syrian general staff were out of their minds with panic that an unauthorized strike had been launched by the 155th Brigade in express defiance of their instructions.'"

I don't know who is right, the administration or The Daily Caller. But for me to make the correct decision on whether to allow an attack, I need to know. And so does the American public.

We have reached the point where the classified information system prevents even trusted members of Congress, who have security clearances, from learning essential facts, and then inhibits them from discussing and debating what they do know. And this extends to matters of war and peace, money and blood. The "security state" is drowning in its own phlegm.

My position is simple: if the administration wants me to vote for war, on this occasion or on any other, then I need to know all the facts. And I'm not the only one who feels that way.

Alan Grayson, a Democratic representative from Florida, is a member of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs.

BRITISH OK Police State


THE BIRTH OF A POLICE STATE: UK POLICE TO BE GRANTED SWEEPING NEW POWERS

 
 
 
 
 
 
71 Votes

PS4 
The UK Government is about to pass legislation which will make any behaviour perceived to potentially ‘cause nuisance or annoyance’ a criminal offence. The Anti-Social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Bill also grants local authorities, police and even private security firms sweeping powers to bar citizens from assembling lawfully in public spaces.  Those who refuse orders under the new rules will face arrest, fines and even prison time.
The Ever Increasing Powers
 PS5
Since the Crime and Disorder Act 1998, which introduced Anti-Social Behaviour Orders (ASBOs)the government has invented and legislated for a litany of such orders covering everything from dog poo to drug addiction, including but not limited to: Control OrdersTerrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures OrdersIntervention OrdersCrack House Closure OrdersPremise Closure OrdersBrothel Closure OrdersGang Related Violence InjunctionsDesignated Public Place OrdersSpecial Interim Management OrdersGating OrdersDog Control OrdersLetter Clearing Notices;  Noise Abatement OrdersGraffiti/Defacement Removal NoticesDirections to Leave and Dispersal Orders.
The Anti-Social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Bill, which passed the committee stage of its progress through the House of Commons on Monday 15th July, purports to simplify this legacy of New Labour’s legislative promiscuity.  In reality, it creates a series of wildly ambiguous, generic orders which grant officers of the state and private sector even greater powers to issue tougher sentences, with fewer checks and balances to protect citizens.
Being Annoying is now Illegal
 PS6
The Bill introduces Injunctions to Prevent Nuisance and Annoyance (IPNAS) to replace ABSO’S. Almost no one will be sad to say goodbye to ASBO’s.  The orders, designed to allow police to tackle anti-social behaviour, simply became a means of criminalising youthful indiscretion – and eventually a means of criminalising anything people found annoying.  Some of the bizarre abuses of this power include:
The ASBO has allowed the line between criminal behaviour and annoying behaviour to become hopelessly blurred – and the IPNAs will only serve to increase the problem.  We have seen the abuses permitted under ASBO legislation, the test for which included wording to the effect that ASBOs could only be issued where an actual act of ‘harassment, alarm or distress’ had occurred.  IPNAs have a much weaker test, applicable where on the ‘balance of probabilities’ a person has or might engage in behaviour ‘capable of causing annoyance’ to another person. How many times a day could this legislation apply to any of us? Eating with our mouths open, talking too loudly into our phones in a public space, walking too slowly or quickly or belching without saying ‘pardon me’.  All of this may very well cause annoyance – but soon it might well also be illegal.
The orders can be issued to anyone aged 10 or over (and we all know how well 10 year olds are at being annoying), and there is no limit on how long an IPNA can be applied to a person for.  A person could receive an IPNA aged 10 and retain it their entire life.
Whereas an ASBO could only desist the subject from certain actions, the IPNA includes ‘positive obligations’ (p10).  This means the subject of an IPNA can be found in breach not simply for doingthings they have been banned from doing, but from not doing things that the IPNA states they must.  This makes an IPNA much closer to probation and other post-conviction arrangements than a civil order.
An IPNA can be applied for by Local Authorities, police, some transport bodies and some NHS authorities.
The consequences of breaching an IPNA are serious.  The breaching of an IPNA has been added to the conditions for securing possession of a home – meaning a 10 year old child breaching their IPNA could result in the entire family being evicted from their council house. Breaching the orders can also result in jail time for anyone over 14.
Even the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO), giving evidence on the proposals, argued that this could lead to further criminalisation of children and called on the government to think again.
But the plans move along unaltered.
 Kiss Goodbye to Freedom of Assembly
 PS7
Public Spaces Protection Orders (PSPOs), and new Dispersal Orders will replace Designated Public Space Orders, Dog Control Orders, Gating Orders and a host of other orders intended to keep aggressive drunken people, or drug dealers or dog poo off of our streets.  But it is plain that the target for these laws is no longer the person peddling illegal drugs, but the people sharing politically challenging ideas.
These new powers present the most significant threat to lawful assembly and protest in modern history.
Public Space Protection Orders
PSPOs will be granted where ‘activities carried on or likely to be carried on in a public place will have or have had a detrimental effect on the quality of life of those in the locality’ (p21).  They can be used to restrict an activity or require people to perform an activity in a certain way.  They require substantially less consultation than current alcohol free zones or dog control zones and rather than applying to everyone, they can be applied to specific groups of people (the homeless, the unemployed, racial/religious groups etc.) – opening the door for discrimination.  These rules could see homeless people or young people lawfully excluded from public spaces.
PSPOs are subject to ‘on the spot’ fines, rather than attendance at a Magistrates Court, reducing the scrutiny and checks on police power.
These orders are also by no means short term.  They can be applied for up to three years, and continued for another three years at the end of their term.
The orders have been heavily challenged by Liberty and The Manifesto Club on the basis that they will seriously infringe upon people’s freedom to assemble, associate and protest.  The Ramblers(the walking charity) have also given written evidence to the government raising their fears about the further appropriation of public highways, by ways and footpaths under the PSPO powers.
Dispersal Orders
Under the current Direction to Leave powers, anyone over 10 years of age can be asked to disperse from a ‘locality’ and stay dispersed for a period not exceeding 48 hours.  Current Dispersal Orders mean a Police Superintendent (or an officer with specific written authority from the SI) candisperse groups of two or more people in areas where there has been ‘persistent anti-social behaviour’ or take home any young person under the age of 16 who is in a dispersal zone between 9pm and 6am.  Anyone failing to comply with a Dispersal Order faces a fine of up to £2,500 or up tothree months in prison.
Downing Street clearly do not feel this is tough enough.
The new Dispersal Powers mean police constables and even Police Community Support Officers (PCSOs) can issue dispersal orders if they think a group of two or more persons mightharass, alarm or distress others in the vicinity (p16).  The PCSO or constable can specify how long the person/group must remain out of the designated area, and by which route they must leave, and also confiscate any items of their property which they deem anti-social.  Failure to comply with any element of these orders results in a fine of up to £5,000 or three months in prison.  The new legislation also fails to define ‘locality’ – meaning a person could be excluded from a city, a county or even a whole country (p17).  In fact, York couldn’t even wait for the new legislation to pass and isalready implementing the powers.
These new laws effectively end freedom of assembly in England and Wales, as any lawful assembly can be instantly redefined as illegal on the spot by some part time PCSO, people’s personal possessions can be confiscated, and anyone who dares to challenge the process will end up in jail.
What will it Take?
One could be forgiven for despairingly enquiring ‘what will it take for the slumbering British public to awake to the fact that the legal and physical infrastructure of a police state is being built around them?’  
Many believe they have rights to protest, assemble and associate that they lost a decade ago, simply because they have never actually attempted to claim them.   They remain imaginary rights, never cashed in.  As someone who has found themselves arrested, locked up and later cleared by a court twice in recent years for peaceful protest (see 1st and 2nd arrests) – I discovered for myself how much things had changed while I wasn’t looking.  So without getting everyone to attend a protest and get arrested, we rely on communicating the changes to those who might not experience them directly.
But while the BBC, our main broadcaster, has devoted its resources to stick a correspondent up the arse of anyone with the faintest connection to the Royal Baby – no such resources have been devoted to informing on the curtailing of our most basic freedoms. Defenders of the BBC may argue they are there to cover the news, not make it – this is an outright lie.
The Media create stories as well as cover them, many people glean what is important from how much it is being talked about on the news and in the papers.  Imagine if journalists were door-stepping David Cameron, human rights campaigners and police authorities all day every day asking what on earth was going to happen with our human rights? If 19 pages of today’s Sun (news)paper wasn’t talking about the Royal Baby but our eroded civil liberties?  Things would look very, very different.
In the meantime, it’s up to all of us with an interest to shout it from the roof tops.  We have a hell of a fight on our hands here, and most folks still don’t even know it.
SIGN THE PETITION TO OPPOSE THIS PIECE OF LEGISLATION BEFORE IT’S TOO LATE

Tuesday, September 3, 2013

Sometimes NSA Bugs Foreigners


U.S. spy agencies mounted 231 offensive cyber-operations in 2011

By Barton Gellman and Ellen Nakashima,August 30, 2013  Washington Post
U.S. intelligence services carried out 231 offensive cyber-operations in 2011, the leading edge of a clandestine campaign that embraces the Internet as a theater of spying, sabotage and war, according to top-secret documents obtained by The Washington Post.
That disclosure, in a classified intelligence budget provided by NSA leaker Edward Snowden, provides new evidence that the Obama administration’s growing ranks of cyber warriors infiltrate and disrupt foreign computer networks.  (And USA patriots  -ed)
Additionally, under an extensive effort code-named GENIE, U.S. computer specialists break into foreign networks so that they can be put under surreptitious U.S. control. Budget documents say the $652 million project has placed “covert implants,” sophisticated malware transmitted from far away, in computers, routers and firewalls on tens of thousands of machines every year, with plans to expand those numbers into the millions.
The documents provided by Snowden and interviews with former U.S. officials describe a campaign of computer intrusions that is far broader and more aggressive than previously understood. The Obama administration treats all such cyber-operations as clandestine and declines to acknowledge them.

The scope and scale of offensive operations represent an evolution in policy, which in the past sought to preserve an international norm against acts of aggression in cyberspace, in part because U.S. economic and military power depend so heavily on computers.(3/4 against "top priority targets" - the remaining 25% were Patriotic American People.  - Ed)

“The policy debate has moved so that offensive options are more prominent now,” said former deputy defense secretary William J. Lynn III, who has not seen the budget document and was speaking generally. “I think there’s more of a case made now that offensive cyberoptions can be an important element in deterring certain adversaries.”  
Of the 231 offensive operations conducted in 2011, the budget said, nearly three-quarters were against top-priority targets, which former officials say includes adversaries such as Iran, Russia, China and North Korea and activities such as nuclear proliferation. The document provided few other details about the operations. 
Stuxnet, a computer worm reportedly developed by the United States and Israel that destroyed Iranian nuclear centrifuges in attacks in 2009 and 2010, is often cited as the most dramatic use of a cyberweapon. Experts said no other known cyberattacks carried out by the United States match the physical damage inflicted in that case.
U.S. agencies define offensive cyber-operations as activities intended “to manipulate, disrupt, deny, degrade, or destroy information resident in computers or computer networks, or the computers and networks themselves,” according to a Presidential directive issued in October 2012.
 (And the USA? - Endless War?)
Most offensive operations have immediate effects only on data or the proper functioning of an adversary’s machine: slowing its network connection, filling its screen with static or scrambling the results of basic calculations. Any of those could have powerful effects if they caused an adversary to botch the timing of an attack, lose control of a computer or miscalculate locations.(Notice any of this on your PC? ed)
U.S. intelligence services are making routine use around the world of government-built malware that differs little in function from the “advanced persistent threats” that U.S. officials attribute to China. The principal difference, U.S. officials told The Post, is that China steals U.S. corporate secrets for financial gain. 
“The Department of Defense does engage” in computer network exploitation, according to an e-mailed statement from an NSA spokesman, whose agency is part of the Defense Department. “The department does ***not*** engage in economic espionage in any domain, including cyber.”  ???

‘Millions of implants’
The administration’s cyber-operations sometimes involve what one budget document calls “field operations” abroad, commonly with the help of CIA operatives or clandestine military forces, “to physically place hardware implants or software modifications.”
NSA group called Tailored Access Operations (TAO). As its name suggests, TAO builds attack tools that are custom-fitted to their targets.  The NSA unit’s software engineers would rather tap into networks than individual computers because there are usually many devices on each network. Tailored Access Operations has software templates to break into common brands and models of “routers, switches and firewalls from multiple product vendor lines,” according to one document describing its work. 

As its name suggests, TAO builds attack tools that are custom-fitted to their targets.
The NSA unit’s software engineers would rather tap into networks than individual computers because there are usually many devices on each network. Tailored Access Operations has software templates to break into common brands and models of “routers, switches and firewalls from multiple product vendor lines,” according to one document describing its work.
The implants that TAO creates are intended to persist through software and equipment upgrades, to copy stored data, “harvest” communications and tunnel into other connected networks. This year TAO is working on implants that “can identify select voice conversations of interest within a target network and exfiltrate select cuts,” or excerpts, according to one budget document. In some cases, a single compromised device opens the door to hundreds or thousands of others.

Sometimes an implant’s purpose is to create a back door for future access. “You pry open the window somewhere and leave it so when you come back the owner doesn’t know it’s unlocked, but you can get back in when you want to,” said one intelligence official, who was speaking generally about the topic and was not privy to the budget. The official spoke on the condition of anonymity to discuss sensitive technology.  (Illegal technology)

Under U.S. cyber doctrine, these operations are known as “exploitation,” not “attack,” but they are essential precursors both to attack and defense.


By the end of this year, GENIE is projected to control at least 85,000 implants in strategically chosen machines around the world. That is quadruple the number — 21,252 — available in 2008, according to the U.S. intelligence budget.

The NSA appears to be planning a rapid expansion of those numbers, which were limited until recently by the need for human operators to take remote control of compromised machines. Even with a staff of 1,870 people, GENIE made full use of only 8,448 of the 68,975 machines with active implants in 2011.

For GENIE’s next phase, according to an authoritative reference document, the NSA has brought online an automated system, code-named TURBINE, that is capable of managing “potentially millions of implants” for intelligence gathering “and active attack.”

‘The ROC’

When it comes time to fight the cyberwar against the best of the NSA’s global competitors, the TAO calls in its elite operators, who work at the agency’s Fort Meade headquarters and in regional operations centers in Georgia, Texas, Colorado and Hawaii. The NSA’s organizational chart has the main office as S321. Nearly everyone calls it “the ROC,” pronounced “rock”: the Remote Operations Center. 

Once the hackers find a hole in an adversary’s defense, “[t]argeted systems are compromised electronically, typically providing access to system functions as well as data. System logs and processes are modified to cloak the intrusion, facilitate future access, and accomplish other operational goals,” according to a 570-page budget blueprint for what the government calls its Consolidated Cryptologic Program, which includes the NSA.


“To the NSA as a whole, the ROC is where the hackers live,” said a former operator from another section who has worked closely with the exploitation teams. “It’s basically the one-stop shop for any kind of active operation that’s not defensive.”


Teams from the FBI, the CIA and U.S. Cyber Command work alongside the ROC, with overlapping missions and legal authorities. So do the operators from the NSA’s National Threat Operations Center, whose mission is focused primarily on cyber­defense. That was Snowden’s job as a Booz Allen Hamilton contractor, and it required him to learn the NSA’s best hacking techniques.

According to one key document, the ROC teams give Cyber Command “specific target related technical and operational material (identification/recognition), tools and techniques that allow the employment of U.S. national and tactical specific computer network attack mechanisms.”

The intelligence community’s cybermissions include defense of military and other classified computer networks against foreign attack, a task that absorbs roughly one-third of a total cyber operations budget of $1.02 billion in fiscal 2013, according to the Cryptologic Program budget. The ROC’s breaking-and-entering mission, supported by the GENIE infrastructure, spends nearly twice as much: $651.7 million.

Most GENIE operations aim for “exploitation” of foreign systems, a term defined in the intelligence budget summary as “surreptitious virtual or physical access to create and sustain a presence inside targeted systems or facilities.” The document adds: “System logs and processes are modified to cloak the intrusion, facilitate future access, and accomplish other operational goals.”

The NSA designs most of its own implants, but it devoted $25.1 million this year to “additional covert purchases of software vulnerabilities” from private malware vendors, a growing gray-market industry based largely in Europe.

‘Most challenging targets’

The budget documents cast U.S. attacks as integral to cyber­defense — describing them in some cases as “active defense.”

If you’re neutralizing someone’s nuclear command and control, that’s a huge attack,” said one former defense official. The greater the physical effect, officials said, the less likely it is that an intrusion can remain hidden.

“The United States is moving toward the use of tools short of traditional weapons that are unattributable — that cannot be easily tied to the attacker — to convince an adversary to change their behavior at a strategic level,” said another former senior U.S. official, who also spoke on the condition of anonymity to discuss sensitive operations.


China and Russia are regarded as the most formidable cyber­threats, and it is not always easy to tell who works for whom. China’s offensive operations are centered in the Technical Reconnaissance Bureau of the People’s Liberation Army, but U.S. intelligence has come to believe that those state-employed hackers by day return to work at night for personal profit, stealing valuable U.S. defense industry secrets and selling them.


Iran is a distant third in capability but is thought to be more strongly motivated to retaliate for Stuxnet with an operation that would not only steal information but erase it and attempt to damage U.S. hardware.


The “most challenging targets” to penetrate are the same in cyber-operations as for all other forms of data collection described in the intelligence budget: Iran, North Korea, China and Russia. GENIE and ROC operators place special focus on locating suspected terrorists “in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen, Iraq, Somalia, and other extremist safe havens,” according to one list of priorities.


The growth of Tailored Access Operations at the NSA has been accompanied by a major expansion of the CIA’s Information Operations Center, or IOC.


The CIA unit employs hundreds of people at facilities in Northern Virginia and has become one of the CIA’s largest divisions. Its primary focus has shifted in recent years from counter-terrorism to cyber security, according to the budget document.


The military’s cyber-operations, including U.S. Cyber Command, have drawn much of the public’s attention, but the IOC undertakes some of the most notable offensive operations, including the recruitment of several new intelligence sources, the document said.


Military cyber-operations personnel grouse that the actions they can take are constrained by the legal authorities that govern them. The Presidential policy directive on cyber-operations issued in October made clear that military cyber-operations that result in the disruption or destruction or even manipulation of computers must be approved by the President. But the directive, the existence of which was first reported last fall by The Post and leaked in June by Snowden, largely does not apply to the intelligence community.


Given the “vast volumes of data” pulled in by the NSA, storage has become a pressing question. The NSA is nearing completion of a massive new data center in Utah. A second one will be built at Fort Meade “to keep pace with cyber processing demands,” the budget document said.


According to the document, a high-performance computing center in Utah will manage “storage, analysis, and intelligence production.” This will allow intelligence agencies “to evaluate similarities among intrusions that could indicate the presence of a coordinated cyber attack, whether from an organized criminal enterprise or a nation-state.”


Editor-This is a smokescreen by the War-at-any-cost Washington Post.  The American People are the target of the NSA and CIA surveillance.  Not foreigners.  What is the NSA doing to USA sovereign people?  That's what we wish to know.  Not how great NSA illegally smashes or captures foreign PCs.  Washington Post twists every story to keep the Next War on the front burner.   Why don't they discuss the Geneva Peace Process? (visit  www.pdwamerica.blogspot.com  for the complete Geneva Peace Plan for Syria.

Monday, September 2, 2013

From 1987 on Drug Police Used AT$T Bugs


Drug Agents Use Vast Phone Trove, Eclipsing NSA's

By Scott Shane, Colin Moynihan, The New York Times
02 September 13
For at least six years, law enforcement officials working on a counter narcotics program have had routine access, using subpoenas, to an enormous AT&T database that contains the records of decades of Americans' phone calls - parallel to but covering a far longer time than the National Security Agency's hotly disputed collection of phone call logs.
The Hemisphere Project, a partnership between Federal and local drug officials and AT&T that has not previously been reported, involves an extremely close association between the Government and the Telecommunications GIANT.
The Government pays AT&T to place its employees in drug-fighting units around the country. Those employees sit alongside Drug Enforcement Administration agents and local detectives and supply them with the Phone Data from as far
 back as 1987.